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THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY 1921: THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY AND LABOUR PRESS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The British Labour Party became increasingly aware after the First World War that it 
was potentially an alternative government in waiting. In opposition the party was 
generally supportive of Irish nationalism. It supported Home Rule and was adamantly 
opposed to the partition of Ireland contained in the 1920 Government of Ireland Bill. 
As the demands of Irish republicans became more radical and their tactics more 
extreme the Labour parliamentary leadership became wary of the electoral damage 
that could ensue if it was perceived by the British public that it was sympathetic to  
revolutionary  Irish republicanism. 
Despite the fact that the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was inconsistent with Labour 
party Irish policy cementing as it did the partition of Ireland as well as hardly being 
an exercise in “self-determination”, both Labour MPs in the debate on the Treaty as 
well as the Labour press supported the Treaty as it offered a way out of the Irish 
imbroglio and a return to rational class-based politics. The overriding concern of, in 
particular, the parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party by now was to prove to 
the British electorate that it could be as protective of British state interests as its 
rivals.  
The article argues that that this pragmatic about turn was adopted as many members 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in particular were acutely aware that the 
party needed to be seen as  patriotic, moderate and responsible if it was to stand any 
chance of being elected to power. The article traces this reversal in policy by 
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reference to contemporary parliamentary debates as well as through the columns of 
the contemporary Labour Press. These are the only sources evidencing this change in 
Labour Party policy. Recent literature on the Labour Party in the 1920s does not 
address this issue. There is no reference to the Anglo-Irish Treaty either in the 
minutes of the PLP nor in the papers of the two major players in Labour Party policy 
on Ireland, the leader Ramsay MacDonald or J. H. Thomas, later Colonial Secretary 
in the first Labour Government with responsibility for Ireland. 
 
KEYWORDS Anglo-Irish Treaty, British Labour Party, Ramsay MacDonald, 
partition, Irish Free State 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 British Labour Party policy on Ireland after the First World War was inevitably 
influenced by the party’s awareness that it was potentially an alternative government 
in waiting. Before this became apparent after 1918 and when it was little more than a 
radical adjunct to the dominant progressive party, the Liberals, Labour could afford 
to support Irish national demands in a general, instinctive and positive manner. 
However, once it became obvious that the Labour Party not only had the opportunity 
to overtake the Liberal Party as the foremost progressive party in Britain but, in 
effect, was the only viable alternative to the Conservatives, party policy had to 
become more focused. This change in fortune and the resultant need to re-assess its 
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Irish policy came about in the years immediately after the First World War and 
exactly at the time the transformation in Irish nationalism was taking place from a 
moderate devolutionist variety to a militant separatist philosophy.  
 
       At this time, when it was on the brink of exercising real political influence, the 
British Labour Party remained an often uneasy coalition of many different interests. 
Founded initially to represent the political interests of the section of the working-
class consisting of trade unionised male industrial workers whose interests were 
interpreted quite narrowly as comprising of improvements in working conditions and 
wages, the early Labour Party unashamedly represented a limited sectional interest. It 
soon became apparent however, that if it was to reach beyond this narrow base it 
needed to broaden its appeal to other progressive sections of society. Allied to its 
trade union base, often uneasily, were the ideological socialists of the Independent 
Labour Party and, in particular, after 1918, middle-class former supporters of the 
Liberal Party who recognised that Labour had now usurped the Liberals’ position as 
the foremost radical party in Britain.  
 
  No survey of the Labour Party and its policy on Ireland can be complete 
without reference to the role of the Labour press, particularly the Daily Herald. Until 
1922, when it was rescued financially by the Labour Party and the TUC, the Herald 
was a Labour-supporting newspaper that was independent of the Labour Party. In this 
position it played an important role as part of the liberal campaign in 1920 and 1921 
which was instrumental in informing the British public of the consequences of the 
military action that was being undertaken in their name in Ireland. It also played an 
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important role in critically but positively supporting Lloyd George during the peace 
negotiations leading up to the signing of the Treaty in 1921. The newspapers of the 
Independent Labour Party (ILP), Forward and Labour Leader, also contributed 
substantially to the debate on Ireland inside the Labour Party, particularly as the ILP 
was the British Labour Party’s radical socialist wing.1 
 
         Occasionally, the Labour Party leadership was taken to task by elements of 
the organised Irish community in Britain as well as by its own left wing and accused 
of not being robust enough in its support for militant Irish nationalism. Usually the 
party hierarchy was well able to fend off such criticism. In the case of the party’s own 
members, criticism was never sustained and usually only emanated periodically from 
either backbench MPs representing, or party members living in, areas with 
substantial Irish populations. The fact was that the party membership, even the more 
militant elements, were, like the party leadership, far more interested in social and 
economic issues rather than getting involved in what they regarded as irrational and 
unpredictable problems such as Ireland for any length of time. In the case of the 
organised Irish community in Britain, the party leadership obviously took into 
account the fact that the largest Irish support organisation in Britain, the Irish Self-
Determination League, put itself beyond the pale when, after the Treaty was signed, it 
came down on the side of the anti-Treaty republican irregulars rather than the pro-
Treaty element. The leadership clearly came to the conclusion at an early stage that 
any courting of the Irish nationalist vote, particularly the republican vote, in Britain, 
could only be at the expense of undermining the party’s carefully planned long-term 
strategy of attempting to appeal to the British electorate as a responsible, moderate 
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and, above all, patriotic party. By and large, this strategy was successful. It only 
occasionally foundered when, for example, Irish voters informed Labour during the 
Stockport by-election in 1920 that it ran the risk of losing the Irish vote as a result of 
the party’s perceived tardiness in supporting Irish nationalist demands.2 
         
Undoubtedly the British Labour Party used and exploited its Irish policy (whether 
in opposition or in government) in order to portray and position itself to the British 
electorate as a competent and responsible party fit to be entrusted with the sound 
management of the affairs and interests of the British state. In opposition, both the 
British Labour Party and a dynamic revolutionary Irish nationalism had a sympathetic 
but wary relationship with each other. However, as British Labour edged closer to 
government and Irish nationalism became overtly revolutionary the distance between 
the two accelerated as an increasingly respectable and cautious Labour Party sought 
to avoid the undoubted electoral rebuff too close an association with Irish 
nationalism could result in. Finally, in government, the relationship became no 
different from that of the two previous British governments of the 1920s involving a 
rigid and legalistic interpretation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in order to ensure that 
Irish politics did not return to the floor of the House of Commons. Indeed, when the 
British Labour Party took on governmental responsibilities in 1924 and became 
determined to establish its credibility at home by effectively representing the interests 
of the British state in the face of the scepticism of its domestic political enemies, it 
was confronted in Ireland by a Free State government that needed to be seen to be 
asserting Irish national prestige in the face of constant attacks by its former allies 
now organised in the anti-Treaty republican movement.  
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       In the autumn of 1921, as the Treaty negotiations between British ministers and 
the Irish republican plenipotentiaries repeatedly oscillated between stalemate and 
progress and often appeared on the brink of complete collapse, the combined forces 
of the British Labour movement took the precaution of re-iterating their position on 
the talks. Included in a joint manifesto on British-American relations issued by the 
General Council of the TUC, the National Executive of the Labour Party and the 
Parliamentary Labour Party was a summary of the British Labour position on Ireland 
as it stood in late 1921. This was the policy first stated during the partition debates on 
the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 and repeated at a special party conference late 
that year and again at annual conference in the summer of 1921. It stated that 
 
Should the present Conference fail, Labour will continue to demand for the Irish 
people whatever constitution for Ireland the Irish people desire, subject only to two 
conditions - that it affords protection to minorities, and that the Constitution 
should prevent Ireland from becoming a military or naval menace to Great Britain - 
a policy which has been accepted by Irish Labour.
3
 
 
 The Articles of Agreement signed on 6 December 1921 and more colloquially 
known as the Anglo-Irish Treaty created the Irish Free State with Dominion status 
similar to that pertaining at the time in Canada and Australia. In fact, Article 2 of the 
Treaty specified that the relationship of the Crown and the Imperial Parliament to the 
new Dominion should be that of the United Kingdom and the Dominion of Canada. 
The new political entity would take on a share of the United Kingdom national debt 
and would not raise a defence force greater, in proportion to the population, than that 
of the United Kingdom. British use of the ‘treaty ports’ in peacetime and other 
facilities in war were guaranteed, but after five years, Irish defence of the coast was 
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conceded, subject to agreement by joint conference. The provisions in respect of 
Northern Ireland maintained the terms of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act for a 
month after the official establishment of the Irish Free State (this occured when the 
Irish Free State Constitution Act received royal assent on 6 December 1922) during 
which Northern Ireland could opt out of the new settlement. If this happened, the 
status quo with Northern Ireland, as constituted in 1921, staying in the United 
Kingdom, would remain. If Ulster chose to join the Free State, the Northern Ireland 
Parliament would remain but as a devolved assembly from Dublin. If Northern 
Ireland opted out of the Free State, Article 12 of the Treaty provided for the 
establishment of a Boundary Commission with three representatives, one from 
Northern Ireland, one from the Free State and one from the United Kingdom, to 
determine the boundary, ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants so far as 
may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions’.4 On 7 December 
1922, Northern Ireland exercised its right under the Treaty to remain outside the Irish 
Free State. 
 
 The Treaty offered Irish nationalists complete independence in domestic 
affairs (including full fiscal autonomy) in the 26 county jurisdiction. It is also 
arguable that, given the rapidly evolving nature of Dominion status inside the British 
Commonwealth, that its ‘external’ freedoms would also be wide ranging and likely to 
expand. The Sinn Fein delegation were persuaded by Lloyd George to accept the 
Treaty because he argued that Ireland’s ‘essential unity’ was given recognition first of 
all by the facility of allowing Northern Ireland to join the Irish Free State if it chose 
to and, if it didn't, by the continuation of the Council of Ireland from the 1920 
Government of Ireland Act. In addition, the Boundary Commission could potentially 
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redraw the border and there was an expectation (or hope) on the Sinn Fein side, 
which Lloyd George assiduously cultivated, that the transference of much of the 
territory occupied by the substantial nationalist community in Northern Ireland to the 
Irish Free State would make it difficult for the northern state to survive. Lee believes 
that it was a substantial negotiating achievement on the part of Lloyd George to give 
the impression to the Irish representatives that the establishment of a Boundary 
Commission would lead to Irish unity, to the extent that they actually signed the 
Treaty. He emphasises the point that Arthur Griffith merely reflected the immaturity 
of nationalist thinking about Ulster in allowing himself to be deluded at the 
negotiations. De Valera, like Griffith and Collins, assumed that the Boundary 
Commission would so emasculate Northern Ireland that the rump would be forced 
into a united Ireland for economic self-preservation. All nationalists, whatever their 
position on the Treaty, insisted on misinterpreting the Ulster situation.
5
 Despite the 
fact that throughout negotiations the British government had rigidly adhered to the 
two conditions that Ireland must remain part of the Empire and that Ulster must not 
be coerced, the Irish signed the Treaty convinced that through the Boundary 
Commission they had secured the ending of partition. 
 
 During the concluding phase of the negotiations, with little definitive 
information being made available by both sides and with events developing rapidly, 
the Daily Herald became convinced that Ulster unionist obduracy and Lloyd 
George’s dependency on the Conservatives inside the Coalition Government for 
political survival was going to result in a proposal falling far short of Irish national 
demands. As late as the weekend before the Treaty was signed, the newspaper was 
coruscating in its condemnation of what ultimately turned out to be the final 
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settlement involving as it did the oath of allegiance, Dominion status, partition and 
the naval ports. All of these, it argued, were simply evidence that the Government 
had given in to the Tories and their allies - the Ulster Unionists. The paper 
complained that 
 
If the so-called new terms offered to Ireland are as rumoured they are no new terms 
at all, but, in essence, a reiteration of the British Government’s old refusal to grant 
either of Ireland’s demands: the demand for real and complete self-determination, 
and the demand for unity… this means the complete knuckling under of the British 
Government to the Die-Hards and Ulster.
6
 
 
Even on the morning the Treaty was signed, the Daily Herald was despondent about 
the likelihood of a successful outcome to negotiations. It predicted that the Irish 
would never agree to the threat of coercion to accept partition or accept an oath of 
allegiance to the king as an alternative to the renewal of hostilities ‘so it is inevitable 
that Lloyd George and the Government will have to confess failure’.7 
 
 On the face of it, the Daily Herald got it spectacularly wrong. The paper’s 
anger and despondency was based on what it saw as terms so overly favourable to 
Ulster being offered to the Irish plenipotentiaries that they would have no alternative 
to reject. When it became apparent on the morning of 6 December that overnight the 
Irish had accepted the terms offered, both the Daily Herald and Labour politicians 
were wrong-footed. However, they quickly recovered. Leading Labour 
parliamentarians J. R. Clynes and Arthur Henderson were interviewed in the Daily 
Herald on 7 December and both expressed gratification at the previous day’s 
developments ‘which triumphantly vindicate the attitude which Labour has 
consistently taken up’ added Clynes, without any awareness of irony at all.8 Indeed, 
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Henderson went further when he claimed that ‘the whole of the British Labour 
movement will welcome the news of the settlement, not only with joy but with great 
satisfaction’ as it vindicated Labour policy as regards self-determination tempered by 
protection for minorities and the removal of Ireland as a naval threat.
9
 After a holding 
statement in its editorial on 7 December, the Daily Herald observed that ‘on the 
details of the settlement we do not propose to comment. Approval or disapproval of 
this or that detail is now irrelevant; what matters is the great hope for the future that 
the settlement gives’.10 
 
 The paper soon recovered its composure, rowed in behind Labour Party 
spokesmen and adopted the same self-congratulatory air which was to characterise 
Labour’s policy on the Treaty. It claimed that 
 
As regards Ireland, the Government has merely done what Labour told it to do 
from the first. It cannot take to itself any credit for the settlement, which has been 
forced out of it by the failure of its own blackguardly ‘reprisals’, by growing and 
worldwide hostility to its brutal excesses, and by the increasing pressure of Labour 
criticism.
11
  
 
It was left to left-winger and future Labour leader George Lansbury to proffer a more 
charitable and conciliatory interpretation but even he continued the tone of self-
congratulation when he argued that 
 
No one would grudge either Galloper Smith [Lord Birkenhead] or Lloyd George 
credit due to them, but the greatest credit of all was due to the Labour Party, which, 
when things were at their worst a few months ago, did its level best to bring about 
such a settlement as had now been reached.
12
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 When the Articles of Agreement were signed on 6 December 1921, a joint 
meeting of the EC of the Labour Party and the TUC General Council, issued a 
statement declaring   
 
with the deepest satisfaction that an agreement has been reached between the 
British Government and Irish representatives... the whole Labour movement 
rejoices that the Irish people are now within sight of a real peace... the Labour 
movement has constantly striven for an Irish settlement in harmony with the 
aspirations of the Irish people and the Labour Party Commission which visited 
Ireland during the dark days of open strife, laid down procedure which was, step 
by step adopted and which culminated in the present agreement. 
13
 
 
This overriding tone of relief and self-congratulation pervaded other Labour 
institutions as well. Labour Leader’s sense of release from the Irish morass was 
apparent when it stated that it ‘matters not that various political parties, Labour, 
Liberal and Coalition, is each claiming a share of the credit for the settlement. It is 
sufficient that the Irish Free State is hailed on all sides with warm-hearted 
approval’.14 It elaborated on this theme elsewhere in the same issue when it declared 
that ‘the Labour Leader, for all the thirty years of its history and unswerving support 
of Irish freedom, welcomes, in common with all the liberal forces in this country, the 
opening of a new era of national culture in the land we have oppressed so long’.15 
The self-congratulation appeared the following week when Arthur Henderson wrote 
that 
 
The Irish peace terms commend themselves to British Labour because the 
settlement follows the lines advocated by Labour a year ago. While they may not 
satisfy everybody either here or over the Irish Channel, they are dishonourable to 
none, and by them the Irish will be masters in their own household. That is 
national freedom.
16
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Ramsay MacDonald put the same sentiment more pithily when he noted in the same 
issue that the ‘agreement vindicates the policy of the Labour Party, and condemns all 
that has happened up to a few weeks ago’.17 MacDonald was also one of the few 
Labour politicians to understand the wider political implications of the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty when he noted that 
 
For forty years we resisted Ireland’s claim when they were advanced 
constitutionally. We now congratulate ourselves in giving her more than ever 
she asked for before, because, in the words of one spokesman, Lord Birkenhead, 
‘there was no prospect of subduing her after she declared civil war’. Are they 
pondering that in Egypt and in India today? 
18
 
 
 It was becoming clear that the sense of relief that greeted the signing of the 
Treaty in Labour circles was beginning to obscure the very real, but conveniently 
overlooked, differences between the terms of the Agreement and what had been 
official Labour Party policy on Ireland. This was most strikingly apparent on the 
issue of partition, which the Treaty clearly buttressed but which had been the reason 
for so much Labour opposition to the Government of Ireland Bill only the previous 
year.  
 
 In the debate on the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 14 December 1921, J. R. Clynes 
MP spoke for the Labour Party in a similar tone to that which he and Henderson had 
adopted immediately after the settlement had been announced. He believed that 
 
Reference has been made to the attitude of the Labour party in relation to these 
Articles. These Articles travel on the lines long advocated by Labour... the 
conscience of the Labour party is easy... I look upon these Articles of Agreement 
as the instrument of a lasting and beneficial settlement between Ireland and this 
country... it is essential to have unity between the South and the North of Ireland 
for the future prosperity of the whole of Ireland. I believe that, until the North 
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and South come together, they can never know how much they have in common 
and how little fundamental cause there is for conflict.... I say, therefore, that the 
Labour party rejoices with the rest of those who, either in the House or in the 
country, welcome this Agreement.
19
 
 
Clynes’ comments were made in the full knowledge that whatever new constitutional 
structures might result from the Treaty, the abolition of partition and the reunification 
of Ireland were not going to be amongst them. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that the overwhelming sense of optimism that resulted from the Treaty being agreed 
when negotiations seemed more likely to fail, blinded Labour politicians to the fact 
that its terms were substantially short of what had been Labour’s demands for 
Ireland. In Labour’s defence, however, was the argument that it would have been 
politically difficult for a British political party to continue to make further demands 
on behalf of nationalist Ireland if its own representatives at the Treaty negotiations 
had already settled for less. 
 
           The terms of the Treaty were discussed in the Commons the following 
week. The Times reported that the debate on the Address in reply to the King’s 
Speech was resumed on 16 December by Arthur Henderson MP who said that 
 
the outstanding fact of the Irish Treaty was that it made peace with Ireland….  
He denied that the Labour Party was unsympathetic to the population of Ulster. 
He agreed that the people of Ulster were entitled to have their position 
safeguarded…. He claimed that the Labour Party had previously expressed 
themselves in favour of the line of approach to a solution that had lately been 
followed by the Government.
20
 
 
Henderson added that there had been no speeches by any of the leaders of the 
Labour Party criticising the Government since the censure motion at the end of 
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October. This was because the Party recognised that the Government was making 
tortuous progress towards agreement. He concluded for Labour by stating that 
 
We welcome the Articles in the Treaty which we hope will be ratified by a large 
majority of this House…. We of the Labour Party have strongly favoured the 
line of approach that has been followed by the Government.
21
 
 
In his conclusion, Henderson referred back to his speech during the censure motion 
the previous October in which he had outlined how the Labour Party would assess 
the outcome of Lloyd George’s negotiations with the Irish delegation. He declared 
that the Party was satisfied that Labour’s demands for the protection of minorities 
and the security of the country had been met by the Treaty which, he believed 
 
will establish an honourable peace and open up a new era of friendship and 
mutual confidence between the British and Irish peoples… not since the 
Government was elected in 1918 has it reflected more accurately the spirit and 
desires of our people than it has done in connection with this matter.
22
 
 
Finally, George Barnes, MP for Glasgow Central and a former wartime coalition 
cabinet minister, stated that the Labour Party had always stood for Home Rule for 
Ireland and therefore claimed the Treaty as its own.
23
 
 
 The Daily Herald, however, remained extremely suspicious of Lloyd 
George’s motives and reacted angrily to rumours that the Prime Minister would seek 
to benefit electorally from apparently securing peace in Ireland by calling a general 
election. It asked furiously 
 
Can the public be diddled into forgetting the Government’s hideous and filthy 
record of outrage and murder in Ireland, and induced to take, for election 
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purposes, the entirely false view that the Government’s move in the right 
direction over Ireland was due to principle instead of expediency? 
24
 
 
The newspaper also reacted in a similar fashion when Birkenhead, the Lord 
Chancellor in the Coalition Government and a signatory of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
accused Labour of seeking to undermine the ‘stability’ provided by Lloyd George’s 
administration. The Herald replied that ‘if there is any hope of stability in Ireland, it 
is because the Coalition did at last, after years of pain and shame, something 
approaching what Labour had told it to do all along’.25 
 
 The Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921, in effect, gave Dominion Home 
Rule to a partitioned Ireland. Harding believes that, to the British Labour movement, 
‘it came as a welcome relief and a convenient excuse for closing the book on their 
own tired Irish policies’.26 In this, the Labour Party was not alone. For both 
Conservatives and Liberals in the Coalition Government the Treaty, on closer 
inspection, seemed to be at odds with both parties traditional stances on Ireland; one 
defending the unity of the United Kingdom and the other prepared to advance limited 
self-government to the island as a whole. However, there was little closer inspection; 
for both Coalition parties, the Treaty was a pragmatic solution to the ages-old 
intractable problem of Ireland and in the words of historian A. J. P. Taylor, Lloyd 
George had now magically ‘conjured it out of existence’.27 Given that the Treaty was 
regarded by most British politicians as a final settlement of Anglo-Irish difficulties, it 
is hardly fair to single out the Labour Party for wanting to wash its hands of the 
whole problem. Undoubtedly, it was with a feeling of relief that Labour left-winger, 
George Lansbury, could confidently state in 1925 that Ireland was ‘a question which 
is practically settled today’.28  
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 By any criterion, however, the Anglo-Irish Treaty fell far short of Labour 
Party policy, enunciated by then Labour chairman William Adamson in the House of 
Commons in November 1920 on the third reading of the Government of Ireland Bill, 
confirmed at the Labour Party Special Conference on Ireland in December 1920 and 
repeated at the June 1921 Labour Party Conference. It obviously protected the 
Unionist minority (in the north, through reconfirming partition and in the south, by a 
senate weighted favourably towards former unionists) and it protected British 
strategic interests by reserving use of some Irish Free State ports to the Royal Navy 
but there was no mention of a Constituent Assembly for the whole country (a 
constant Labour demand) and the proposed Council of Ireland was a pale substitute. 
Ironically, it can be argued that it was the Labour Party retreating from ‘free and 
absolute self-determination’ as elaborated at its annual conference at Scarborough in 
1920 to an insistence on the protection of minorities at its conference the following 
year that had facilitated its acceptance of partition. However, in the euphoria of the 
time the feeling of relief that the Irish question was at long last off the British 
political agenda and an impatience to concentrate again on British domestic issues 
meant that this potentially awkward detail was quickly ignored, even if it was at all 
recognised. Yet the Treaty terms were substantially short of what official Labour 
Party policy was on Ireland. Only a year earlier, the party had vehemently opposed 
the partitionist nature of the Government of Ireland Bill and had in fact boycotted the 
Bill in protest. Now they were giving their wholehearted support to a Treaty which to 
all intents and purposes reinforced the very partition of Ireland the party had always 
strenuously opposed. It seemed that Labour was no different to the other political 
parties when it wanted to see an end to the debilitating and, during the period of 
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terror and counter-terror, polluting effect of the Irish question on the British 
democratic system. 
 
 In their contributions to the House of Commons debate on the Treaty, Labour 
MPs hardly ever referred to the outstanding boundary issue even though anti-
partitionism was the one issue which united the entire spectrum of Labour opinion on 
Ireland. The desire to move back to the safer political ground of traditional party 
politics in Britain obviously overcame any lingering tendencies (if there were any) to 
compare in any detail the apparent contradictions between the Treaty and Labour 
policy on Ireland.  However, in supporting the Treaty and, by implication, Article 12 
setting up the Boundary Commission, Labour at least tacitly accepted partition albeit 
with the possibility of revision of the boundary. 
 
 The potential embarrassment caused by the continuation of partition was 
nothing, however, to the paroxysms of fear that surfaced in British Labour politicians 
whenever the party was in danger of being associated in the public mind with 
revolutionary Irish nationalism. Thus explains why, according to McDermott, ‘the 
Labour Party, as a constitutional party aware that its day of glory was near, had 
neither the opportunity nor desire to oppose the treaty’.29 
 
 Finally, in a letter to The Times, Fred Bramley, Assistant Secretary of the 
TUC General Council attempted to justify the Labour reaction to the Treaty and 
looked forward to the future when he said that 
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British Labour made no attempt to intervene to influence or to jeopardize in any 
way the [Treaty] negotiations which were taking place. We have also left the Irish 
people to accept or reject the findings of the official conference [the Dail Treaty 
debate] and British Labour now stands prepared to assist the Irish people to 
complete their political and economic emancipation. 
 
He went on to call for an Inter-State Congress of Labour to be established ‘for the 
purpose of securing a greater unity of purpose between the workers of Ireland and 
Great Britain’.30 Paradoxically, it was left to J. H. Thomas, the anti-republican trade 
union leader who had, to the fury of many Labour left-wingers, repeatedly expressed 
his preference for Dominion Home Rule, to draw attention to the shortcomings of the 
Treaty, which he did on the second reading of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill 
on 17 February 1922, saying ‘I do not believe you will ever get real peace with two 
parliaments’.31 
 
 There was disquiet inside the Labour movement as regards the continued 
existence of partition. The issue had not been satisfactorily addressed in a Treaty 
Labour had wholeheartedly welcomed. This anxiety surfaced usually after IRA 
outrages on the border in the early months of 1922. Following IRA incursions into 
the north, the Daily Herald commented on the unresolved issue of the border, arguing 
that 
 
Of course, the Ulster boundary must be altered, and drastically. Best of all would 
it be for Ulster to come into a united Ireland. Failing that, the right which Ulster 
itself claims to contract out of Ireland must obviously be conceded to 
predominately Nationalist areas to contract out of Ulster.
32
 
 
Usually, however, Labour preferred to continue to blame Lloyd George for the 
problem, as the Herald did when the IRA killed four Northern Ireland B Special 
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police auxiliaries in an attack on a train at Clones railway station on 12 February. In 
an editorial the following day, the paper commented that in Ireland ‘there is 
controversy and conflict over the border-line of Ulster. It seems that Mr Lloyd 
George must have said one thing to the representatives of one side; and the opposite 
to the representatives of the other’.33 
 
 In the debate on the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill, J. R. Clynes offered 
Labour support to the Government and suggested that the border issue could be 
resolved by recourse to a plebiscite. He went on to add that ‘if there is any assistance 
which by speech or act we can give to the Government, in relation to settling Irish 
controversies, the Prime Minister may depend upon carrying with him our fullest 
goodwill’.34 The Times reported Thomas as going on to say that the Labour Party 
believed that the Bill should be ratified as speedily as possible as 
 
No Government had been faced with greater difficulties than those which 
confronted the Government of the Irish Free State…. Were the Bill to be rejected 
the consequences in Ireland would be disastrous. It would be said: ‘Here is another 
illustration of English bad faith’. The foundations of the British Empire would also 
be shaken.
35
 
 
Thomas also alluded to the war-weariness which existed amongst the British public. 
He stressed that 
 
If there was anything of which the British people were more sick of it was this Irish 
trouble; and if any one proposed at a public meeting to send more British troops to 
Ireland and spend more money there, he would get a very short answer…. It was 
by agreement between North and South that the trouble must be settled…. The 
Labour Party, therefore, would support the Government…. They were not prepared 
to make political capital out of the unfortunate state of affairs in Ireland. They 
believed the Government were right in making the Treaty, and they would vote for 
the Bill.
36
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He was backed up by George Barnes who also appealed to the House to pass the Bill 
as speedily as possible ‘so that the Provisional Government [of the Irish Free State] 
might be armed with power and authority to restore order in Ireland’.37 
 
            A  Conservative Die-hard amendment to the Bill demanding that the second 
reading be postponed until either the Boundary Commission element of the Treaty 
was eliminated or that any Boundary Commission decision be approved by the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland was roundly defeated by 302 votes to 60 and the Bill 
was then read a second time. In his contribution to the debate on the amendment, 
Barnes ridiculed Die-hard anxieties, stating that the readjustment of the boundary 
was a matter of practical politics in that it was only concerned with minimal changes 
in areas close to the border. He went on to say that ‘if it was a matter of a large area 
like Derry being taken out of Northern Ireland that would be a different thing 
altogether… outside the range of practical politics’. 38 Thomas had already stated 
during the debate on the amendment that ‘the situation was far too difficult for 
Labour to wish to make party capital out of it’. This was to sum up Labour policy in 
the future.
39
 
 
            
 Notwithstanding Thomas' reservations, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Labour Party welcomed the Treaty with such enthusiasm as they were merely 
representing the public mood not only in Britain but also in Ireland. Opposition to the 
settlement, apart from the Ulster unionists who were furious at the imposition of the 
Boundary Commission over their heads, came from the extremes of politics in both 
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countries. In Britain, most animosity came from the Die-hard Conservatives whose 
influence on Irish policy had declined substantially. In Ireland, it came from the die-
hard republicans, out of tune with popular sentiment there as was evidenced by the 
June 1922 General Election results in the incipient Free State. Furthermore, if 
moderate opinion in Sinn Fein was at least prepared to accept the Treaty if the 
Boundary Commission gave them some eventual hope of a united Ireland, it would 
have been politically implausible for the main opposition party in Great Britain to 
appear more republican than the republicans by continuing to demand an all-Ireland 
constituent assembly in order to determine Ireland's future political status.
40
 Apart 
from anything else, the leadership of the party was acutely conscious of their role as 
the government-in-waiting, determined to be seen to be maintaining a careful, 
constitutional, moderate and respectable approach on all issues.
41
 
 
 On 7 January 1922, the Treaty was approved in Dail Eireann by the perilously 
close margin of 64 to 57 votes. In the immediate aftermath of the narrow acceptance 
of the Treaty, both pro- and anti-Treaty forces in the IRA manoeuvred to get their 
forces into the key military positions vacated by British forces in the opening months 
of 1922. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government, established by the Treaty, 
appeared reluctant to confront its anti-Treaty former comrades-in-arms. This caused 
political embarrassment for the Coalition Government at Westminster. On the third 
reading of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill, the Government and Churchill, as 
Colonial Secretary, in particular, came in for sustained criticism from Conservatives 
both inside and outside the Coalition. They attacked the Government’s perceived 
unwillingness to remonstrate with the Provisional Government as regards the 
worsening security situation in the nascent Irish Free State. Criticising Churchill for 
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his opaque and obfuscating language as to the legal and constitutional limbo Ireland 
was now in, Lord Hugh Cecil, scion of the Salisbury family, sarcastically remarked 
that 
 
What the Right Honourable gentleman really meant to say was that we did not 
regard Ireland as independent, but that we earnestly wished that in Ireland it 
should be thought that we did.
42
 
 
In response, Labour backbencher Colonel Josiah Wedgwood’s remarkably frank 
comments attracted Unionist cheers and, no doubt, caused the Labour leadership 
embarrassment, when he claimed that the Labour Party was 
 
quite satisfied with the words as they stood in the Bill. They were convinced it 
was a Treaty that had been made between this country and the Irish Republic and 
it was useless for the Government to try to evade the issue by alleging the words 
were merely formal.
43
  
 
  
Wedgwood also managed to make capital out of the split in the Government over the 
Irish settlement when he jibed   
 
Far be it from bystanders like the Labour Party to interfere in the domestic 
differences of the two interesting parties [Coalition Unionists and Liberals 
versus the Unionist Diehards] who are at present engaged in denouncing each 
other. The man who interferes between husband and wife is likely to get into 
trouble.
44
 
 
 In the same debate, the Ulster Unionist MP, Captain Charles Craig, argued 
that Northern Ireland should be allowed to vote itself out of the Irish Free State  
sooner rather than later. This should happen, he suggested, as soon as the Bill was 
passed, rather than after the Free State had come into existence, as Unionists were 
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worried that if a Labour Government came to power it might interpret the Treaty 
differently and refuse to allow Northern Ireland to opt out.
45
 Shortly afterwards, in a 
speech which seemed to sum up the relief of Labour members in general, the Labour 
backbencher, Jack Jones, said he was speaking as an Irishman living in England. As 
such he believed that the Treaty was ‘the best thing ever done in regard to the Irish 
problem, and all parties ought to unite in carrying it into effect’.46 
 
 On 8 March 1922, the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill passed through the 
House of Commons with a majority of 243. It was agreed by the House of Lords on 
31 March and received the Royal Assent the same day. At the final reading of the Bill 
on 31 March, the Labour backbencher Colonel Josiah Wedgwood promised that 
‘when a change of Government came about, the Labour Party would more easily be 
able to secure the continuance of those good conditions it had never done anything to 
destroy’.47 
 
 In Ireland, however, political instability had not been ended by the signing of 
the Treaty and the agreement to establish the Irish Free State. Already in the south 
pro- and anti-Treaty forces were jockeying for both political and military positions 
while, in the north, sectarian bloodletting was beginning to reach previously 
unimagined depths. In response to the murder of five members of the Catholic 
McMahon family, both Craig (the northern premier) and Collins (as Chairman of the 
Provisional Government of the Irish Free State) were summoned to London. At first, 
it seemed as if Craig would refuse to travel unless Article 12 of the Treaty setting up 
the Boundary Commission was withdrawn. This provided the Daily Herald with 
another opportunity to highlight Lloyd George’s supposed perfidy. It stated that 
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The boundary clause in the Treaty is of course, an unsatisfactory clause, because 
it is so inconclusive. It is one of the innumerable examples of Mr Lloyd 
George’s talent for being too clever by half - for finding a formula which one set 
of people takes to mean one thing while another set of people takes it to mean 
another.
48
 
 
 
 In early 1922, when Ireland appeared on the brink of civil war over the 
Treaty, the British Labour Party stood on the threshold of parliamentary success. It 
was now the largest opposition party ranged against the faltering and increasingly 
Conservative-dominated Coalition Government. It had been forced to think and act 
like an alternative government when rapidly evolving its policy on Ireland from 
Home Rule to Dominion Home Rule and ‘self determination’, unlike the period 
before 1914 when it merely fell in behind the Liberals and the Irish Nationalist Party 
and allowed these two rival parties to, in effect, determine Labour's Irish policy.  
 
  
The constant and uppermost concern of the Labour Party after 1918 was that, at all 
costs, it must maintain its reputation for moderation and parliamentarianism. 
Fortunately for Labour, it came through its evolution of an Irish policy with both 
intact. ‘Self-determination’ did not mean sympathy for extremist republicanism and 
the party heavily castigated Sinn Fein and the Coalition Government when it felt both 
were departing from traditional parliamentary methods in order to achieve political 
ends. In a backhanded compliment to Labour, the disillusioned Lord Carson, 
contributing to the second reading of the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill in the 
Lords, expressed his frustration with a government who, as he saw it, had 
surrendered Ireland to gunmen. He bitterly complained that 
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We are told that Labour is not fit to govern, and that we must unite against 
Labour as a means of keeping the Coalition together. When I am told that we 
must be afraid of Labour I ask: What could Labour do worse for the shattering of 
the Constitution, the precedent for which has been laid down by the Government 
under this Bill?
49
 
 
  
However, Ireland, long a faultline in British politics with the Conservatives staunchly 
backing Irish (and later Ulster) Unionism in response to Liberal and Labour support 
for Irish nationalism, ceased to be a divisive party political issue in British politics as 
the 1920s progressed. The Anglo-Irish Treaty, negotiated by both Conservatives and 
Liberals in Lloyd George’s Coalition Government, had effectively neutralised 
Ireland’s ability to foment party political antagonism at Westminster. At least 
Labour, on the verge of government, hoped it had. The party’s overriding concern 
was to be seen to be capable of representing British state interests as assertively and 
as comprehensively as its predecessors. By 1924, when the first Labour Government 
in Britain took office, the full implementation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty by whichever 
party was in government had begun to take on the status of “holy writ” irrespective of 
whatever political reservations may have been expressed when it first appeared in 
December 1921.  
 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Treaty was overwhelmingly accepted by the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party (through its organ Labour 
Leader), the TUC and the Daily Herald. The justification was that the majority of 
Irish people had accepted it, that it provided a promise of peace, that it would 
eventually lead to Irish unity and that it would improve Anglo-Irish relations. The 
 26 
criticism of the Labour Party is not that it did not oppose the Treaty on the grounds 
that it was imperialistic as obviously either it did not interpret it as such or else the 
Labour Party itself was not anti-imperialist (or both!). It can be criticised on the 
grounds that the Treaty, in the context of Lloyd George’s threats to unleash a renewal 
of the war if it was not signed, did not constitute ‘self-determination’ which was 
Labour Party policy although the definition of this was consistently ambiguous. 
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